ACCIDENT LITIGATION.

Is Our System Adequate? Are Other Systems Possible?
The general use of machinery has greatly increased the
quantity of accident litigation. There are daily in the United
States many hundreds of accidental deaths and lesser injuries
for each of which some one is responsible. The attempts to fix
and to measure responsibility for such losses constitute the great
mass of accident litigation which absorbs so much of the energies of our profession. Although the quantity of such litigation
has been reduced to a considerable extent by workmen's compensation laws, there is a constantly increasing volume which
presents a problem of importance.
If I am hurt or killed by your automobile, I or my family
suffer a loss which must somehow be made up. The law recognizes the necessity of compensation, but allows it only if responsibility can be fixed on the driver of the automobile or onhis
master. The right to compensation is based on the conception
that a wrongdoer should repair the wrong so far as possible by
making individual reparation to the injured person; but there is
no attempt to recognize the community's interest to save the injured man or his family from- coming on public or private charity. In short, the problem is considered as individual rather
than social.
The narrower conception is natural, and was sufficient for
the communities of a hundred years ago. Is it sufficient today?
If no help or remedy were afforded today to one hurt by
a machine, we should all admit the need of legislation. Such
legislation would try to create a system by which an injured
person or his family would receive compensation correctly calculated, easily fixed and quickly paid. Every lawyer knows that
no such system exists today, except in cases covered by workmen's compensation acts. If we examine the familiar ground
as impartial critics, we shall find defects which must seem to
the lay citizen even larger than they seem to us.
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The damages should. be calculated so as actually to compensate for the loss sustained. The injured person and his family should be put, so far as possible, in the position which they
would have occupied if the accident had not happened. In so
far as the damages are above or below this standard, the equilibrium is disturbed for no good reason, and the plaintiff becomes
either the victim of injustice or the beneficiary of chance.
When a jury calculates damages in an accident case, they
consider (presumably) the former earnings of the injured person and the extent to which these will be reduced. This is necessarily-the basis of any estimate of such damages, but unfortunately it can seldom be calculated accurately. If, for instance,
a clerk forty years old, earning fifty dollars a week, receives internal injuries which are serious but not fatal, how much has he
lost in earning pover? The law allows him to prove by insurance tables the average expectation of life of a man of forty and
the jury may jump to the conclusion that the plaintiff has the
average expectation. Beyond this, all is largely guesswork. No
jury can tell how much the plaintiff's injuries will interfere with
his work, and so we generally have a verdict which shows its
inaccuracy by its round figures.
To maim a bank president is more expensive than to maim
a dog-catcher. But even if you do disable so great a financier
you need not compensate him for his actual loss. Suppose that
he is a young man earning $25,0oo a year, and suppose that the
circumstances indicate that he will live for at least twenty years
and will thus be deprived' of half a million dollars of salary by
your carelessness. No jury will give him the present value of
that sum or anything like it, and if they did, the court would
cut the verdict down to a figure within the popular comprehension.
In short, the amount allowed for loss of earning power is the
result of a guess in most cases, and is not allowed to approach
the actual amount of loss if that is very high.
The jury may also allow for physical pain. Of course pain
cannot be measured by money any more accurately than pleasure
can be measured by pounds or anger by gallons. The payment
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of money to compensate for pain is really an effort to make
the sufferer forget his suffering and to make the sinner repent him
of his sin; it has no real relation to compensation except in so
far as it affords future pleasure to counterbalance past-.pain.
Pain is not financial loss and therefore cannot be compensated
by financial gain. Punitive damages are of course not compensatory. They measure the defendant's loss, but not the plaintiff's,
When an accident case goes to trial twice or more, the juries
usually differ in the amounts of their verdicts. In other words,
the same facts elicit from one jury more dollars than from another. Where there is a difference between verdicts in the same
case, it is plain that there will be, as we all know that there are,
wide differences between verdicts in cases very similar to each
other. Jones may recover $25oo for a broken leg, while Brown
in the adjoining courtroom is recovering only $5oo, although all
of the circumstances upon which the amount of the verdict theoretically depends are like those in Jones' case. The difference
between the verdicts is due to the impression made by a clever
witness on one side or by a stupid witness on the other, or
it is due to the peculiarities of the judges or of the juries. But
a difference there is, and that without logical reason.
The doctrine of contributory negligence is another factor
which prevents verdicts from approximating actual compensation
for the loss sustained. Where the common law rule prevails, the
jury is instructed to find for the defendant if the plaintiff has been
at all negligent. This often results in a compromise verdict,
by which the greater negligence of the defendant and the less
negligence of the plaintiff are compounded to produce rough and
ready justice. The attitude of the jury is natural, almost inevitable, but the verdict awards damages riot compensatory, because
not calculated with a view to compensation.
When an accident case is settled before trial, the settlement
often depends upon considerations which have no relation to
compensation. Are verdicts running high or low just now?
Does the defendant know that the plaintiff probably cannot prove
agency? Is the plaintiff ignorant enough to settle a large claim
for a small sum without advice of counsel? How great is the
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plaintiff's immediate need for money? Such questions instantly
suggest themselves to one's mind as questions which must be
answered before a settlement can be had, and yet they indicate
that the business of adjusting the claim without a trial resembles
a game rather than a search for justice.
To litigate a claim for severe injuries or death requires frequently the payment of large sums to experts, investigators, counsel and witnesses. When the plaintiff receives his final check,
he will, if he be philosophical, reflect that his loss has been the
public's gain because it has given rise to lucrative employment
for so many good citizens. A large share of the compensation
awarded to the plaintiff goes necessarily to compensate those who
have helped him to assert his right. It follows that in many
cases the plaintiff does not even receive the compensation which
the jury has determined to be adequate, although in many other
cases the jury include in the verdict what they estimate to be the
expense of the litigation.
It has been suggested that a person injured by the negligence of another should receive compensation calculated, so far
as possible, to meet the loss sustained, no more, no less. The
failure to realize this principle is due, in part at least, to the
causes touched upon: (i) The difficulty of estimating loss in
earning power; (2) the impossibility of measuring pain by a
money standard; (3) the non-compensatory nature of punitive
damages; (4) the vagaries of juries; (5) the doctrine of contributory negligence; (6) the element of chance in settlements;
and (7) the expense of conducting litigation.
In the remedial system which would be created de novo if
none were in existence, there would be, so far as possible, provision for the correct calculation of compensatory damages, and
an adaptation of the machinery of the law so as to facilitate
such calculations. Tie present machinery may, upon careful investigation, appear ill-fitted for a task grown so greatly beyond
its dimensions of a century ago. If the total energy exerted by
lawyers, clerks of the courts, sheriffs, judges, juries, tipstaves,
printers, 'stenographers, messengers, investigators and experts
could be expressed in kilowatt hours, how many of such units
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would be found to have been expended in accident litigation? Although such a mathematical computation -is impossible, an approximation of the truth could be gained by the gathering of
certain data.
Taking for investigation a restricted field. such as one year's
litigation in a large city, a comparison could readily be made
between the total number of actions and suits brought and the
number of actions brought to recover damages due to negligence.
The comparisons could be extended to show for all cases, and
separately for negligence cases, the number of cases brought to
trial, the number of hours consumed in trial, and the number
of appeals. From such data might be reached a fair approximation of the amount of energy spent in settling accident litigation.
Of course, conclusions based on the comparisons suggested
would be inaccurate. They would rest only on measurable elements, failing to consider, for instance, the time spent in arguing and deciding questions of law before and after trial, or the
time spent by lawyers and their assistants in preparation. But
the results would be valuable because they would indicate the
size of the problem of accident litigation.
The supposed ideal system would produce a payment of
damages to the injured party as soon as possible after the accident. Under our present system payments are usually slow,
unless speed is furnished by the meeting of an enterprising claim
agent with an ignorant plaintiff. Failing such an achievement in
behalf of the defendant, the causes of delay are numerous: the
attorney's investigation and preparation, the length of the trial
list, the absence of witnesses, the engagements of counsel, the
errors which require a new trial and the errors, real or.imaginary,
which occasion an appeal. The months and years must run
slowly for many a plaintiff who endures .such mischances as
these.
When the verdict has been rendered, it may be difficult or
impossible to collect. If the owner of the Ford which struck
you lives in a rented house on a small salary and carries no lia-
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bility insurance, your hurt will probaby turn out to be damnum
absque pecuzita.
In a consideration of the defects of the present system and
of possible changes, it must be remembered that no human system is free from defects; each has its elements of delay, inaccuracy and perhaps injustice. We must be content with methods
which on the whole have the greatest measure of advantage and
the least measure of disadvantage.
A number of factors have been pointed out which contribite to make the amount of recovery a matter of guesswork and
hence to increase the element of uncertainty in the administration of justice. The use of a fixed schedule of damages wouldgreatly reduce this uncertainty. In such a schedule the amount
should be based on (a)*the amount of money actually disbursed
by the plaintiff in consequence of the accident, (b) the actual and
prospective loss in earnings, and (c) the gravity of the injury.
The first of these is of course susceptible of exact measurement. It includes money paid to doctors, druggists, nurses, and
undertakers, and in this respect does not differ from the verdict
as calculated under existing law. These items may be permitted
to vary in accordance with the facts of each case, because they are
so easily proved that there can seldom be a dispute with respect
to their correctness.
The amounts recoverable according to the proposed schedule would also vary according to the actual and prospective loss
of earnings. This, of course, introduces the element of inaccuracy into the calculation. If a man has lost his leg, it is-often
possible to tell just how much wages he has lost before lie is
about again, but it may be impossible to tell how much his earning power has been impaired. In some cases there may be no
impairment and in others there may. be a total destruction of
earning power. Upon this matter the jury now exercises its
guessing powers, sorfietimes approximating a figure subsequently
justified by the facts, but more often taking simply a shot in the
dark, or at best in the dusk.
To standardize this element of damages so far as possible is.
admittedly, to adopt a system not exactly compensatory. This
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is also true of the workmen's compensation acts which set a scale
of compensation based on the earnings of the plaintiff and on
the nature of 'the injury. For example, the Pennsylvania act
allows for the loss of a hand 6o per cent of wages for 175 weeks,
for the loss of an arm 6o per cent. of wages for 215 weeks, and
so on, varying according to the member lost. The amounts thus
fixed seldom measure accurately the loss of earning power. But
a great advantage lies in the fact that they aie fixed, and that
in these simple cases at least there is no room for dispute as to
the amount recoverable. The sdme is true under the workmen's
compensation acts with respect to death.
There must of course be many kinds of injuries which cannot be exactly defined before the event, for lack of space and of
the prophetic gift. In these cases the schedule should limit the
amount recoverable to the actual and prospective loss of earnings during a stated period. If, for example, this period were
five years, it would be much easier to compute the probable loss
than it is now with the plaintiff's whole future life to speculate
upon. To dole the money out to the plaintiff week by week, or
month by month, according as he should show his losses at the
time, would be too onerous, because it would involve continual
supervision to guard -against fraud. Here again, it is necessary
to balance advantages. A limit of five years would doubtless
hurt some deserving plaintiffs whose disabilities extended far
beyond that period. On the other hand, such a limit would
greatly facilitate the calculation and settlement of claims, as it
has under the workmen's compensation acts.
In alf these cases a total disability can be provided for by
schedule, irrespective of its cause, but a partial disability presents a question more difficult of solution. Some person or persons, a judge or a jury or a referee, must determine just what
the loss of earning power has been, and probably there must be
a limit to the period for which the compensation is calculated.
In the preceding paragraphs an analogy between the case of
the injured employe and that of the injured citizen has been
implied. There is of course a"very important difference between
the two. The employe has entered into a voluntary relation
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uhich involves the risks of his employment; it is therefore reasonable that he should receive only a limited amount in case of
injury. The ordinary citizen, on the other hand, enters into a
strictly involuntary relation with the man who injures him and
it will be said that there is no reason why he should not exact
from the defendant every cent of his loss. If he can recover
only according to 'a fixed" ScleduTe, his damages wiil'probably bi
less than those which a jury would give -him.
The answer to this objection is two-fold. In the first place,
the public convenience, as well as the rights of the plaintiff, must
be consulted. If it appears that a system. strictly upholding the
plaintiff's rights is costly,, cumbersome,, slow and wasteful of
human energy, the plaintiff's rights must give way to the paramount rights of the public. In the second place, it must be remembered that to recover damages today one must show negligence on the part of the defendant, except under the workmen's
compensation acts. If the analogy between the two kinds of
accident cases were complete, so that it became unnecessary toshow negligence in the non-employment case, the benefits thus
given to many innocent plaintiffs would outweigh the possible injury done to those plaintiffs who could show that they were
injured by the negligence of another. This aspect of the situation is referred to more fully hereafter.
Another difference between the operation of the workmens
compensation acts and that of the proposed schedule of damages
lies in the calculation of earnings. Where a man is working for
a salary or for wages, the basis of compensation is ready to
hand. But if a schedule of damages based on earnings were
applied to the case of a doctor, or a lawyer or a real estate operator, how should the plaintiff's earnings be calculated? Suppose, for instance, that a lawyer has earned (or at any rate received) a fee of $ioo,ooo just before he is injured. Should his
annual earnings be figured at $ioo,ooo plus? And in the case
of the real estate operator, it will be difficult to determine how
much of his profits have been due to his work and how much
to the use of his capital.
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There is no escape from these difficulties under -the present
system, or under any system which allows compensation for decrease in earning power or for loss of earnings. In preparing a
schedule it would be necessary to cut the Gordian knot by applying a rule of thumb. The lawyer, for example, might he allowed
as annual earnings, the average of his earnings for the past
three years. The real estate operator might be allowed a similar
average, first deducting his income from capital, which could be
calculated at a stated per cent. on his average capital during the
three years period.
To work out a fair rule for cases of injury to children is
more difficult. There is no present earning power; there are simply the seeds of possible earning power in .the future. If a claim
is made by a parent for the death of his child, the measure of
compensation is and should be the difference between the earnings
which the child would have paid the parent and the expense of
rearing and education. Since these items are not susceptible of exact, or even of approximate calculation, a schedule fixing the
amount of damages according to the child's age would be as fair
as the ordinary verdict, and would have the advantages of certainty and speed.
Where the claim is by the injured child himself, the present
value of his loss of future earning power is the measure of compensation. In a schedule, figures could be fixed for specified injuries occurring at specified ages-for instance, so much for the
loss of a hand at the age of ten. But no such figures could be
predetermined for the many injuries not susceptible of exact
definition. A judge or jury or referee would have to fix the
amount of compensation in such a case, probably using in the
calculation a time limit provided by law.
The difficulties and the advantages of standardizing the
measure of damages to meet loss in earning power have been
pointed out. It remains to consider the part which the extent
of the injury should play in fixing the amount to be recovered.
Where the injury stops or impairs the earning power, the length
of cessation or the extent of impairment is the measure of damages. But where there have been and will be no earnings, many
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will think that there should nevertheless be compensation in addition to what is paid to 'cover the plaintiff's actual expenses.
This would apply, for example, to the housekeeper of a family
or to a-retired business man.
Of course a payment made to such a plaintiff is not compensation at all; it is heart-balm only. But there is a widespread feeling that such payments are proper and it should accordingly be considered whether they should not be provided
for in the schedule. An amount could be fixed for each of the
more common injuries payable in addition to, or irrespective of,
or as a minimum contribution toward, the loss of earnings. For
less common injuries, not susceptible of exact definition in advance, there is no satisfactory way of fixing damages. For these
injuries, it would be necessary either to abandon the idea of damages except for expenses or loss of earnings, or else to allow a
jury to fix them.
To standardize damages would of course increase the number of settlements and so reduce the quantity of litigation and
the consequent burden upon judicial machinery. Does experience indicate that the method of fixing damages and liability
which is prescribed by the workmen's compensation laws should
be employed in all accident cases? Can a referee reach a fair
conclusion more quickly than a jury, and will the conclusion be
so often fair? One is inclined to believe that on questions of
liability for negligence the determinations of twelve average citizens will approximate fairness more frequently than will the determinations of a single man, no matter what his experience.
If this is true, a further thought suggests itself. Since liability for negligence can best be fixed by a jury trial, and since
the system of trial by jury involves marked disadvantages of
delay and expense, why not discard the question of liability altogether and assign to referees the duty of calculating compensation according to fixed schedules?
In many states workmen's compensation laws require the
man who receives the profits of a business to pay the losses caused
by the injuries and deaths which are recognized as unavoidable
incidents to industry; the question of negligence plays no part
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in the matter. So it is in the business of daily life; danger is a
constant companion whom we canndt escape. As a man cannot
work in a mill without exposing himself to the danger of flying
belts, sagging floors or boiling vats, so a man cannot use the
highway without exposing himself to the perils of trains, trolleys, and automobiles.
If the owner of a business pays for its inevitable destructions, is it not proper that the public should pay for the losses
unavoidably incident to modem life?. In short, why should not
any person injured by a train, trolley or automobile recover compensation from a public fund, -and that without reference to the
question of negligence? In certainty, simplicity and speed the
process would compare favorably with an action at law involving a trial by jury. Moreover the injured man would be sure
of receiving the sum awarded, while now the successful plaintiff must depend on the solvency, and in many cases on the comparative wealth, of the defendant.
Under the jury system the trial will occupy perhaps a day,
or even more, during which time a $io,ooo judge, three $i8oo
court officers, a $4oo0 stenographer, a whole panel of $3 a day
jurors, a roomful of witnesses and litigants losing a day's work,
and two highly-paid attorneys, focus their minds on the plaintiff's troubles. Under the suggested system, the total of public
time and money consumed would certainly be very much less.
It will be said that a system which eliminates the questions
of negligence and of contributory negligence makes for recklessness on the one hand and for intentional injuries on the
other. But today most train, trolley and automobile accidents
are caused by persons who have no financial stake in the matter.
They are either employes without resources or else they carry
liability insurance. A man is deterred from carelessly injuring
another by his shrinking from physical injury to a fellow man
and by fear of the criminal law. Both of these incentives would
operate as powerfully under one system of compensation as
under the other. It is fair to assume, too, that interest in the
adoption of safety measures would be stimulated if all accidents
were plainly costly to the public.
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As to self-inflicted injury, there is little doubt that this
would give trouble. But it seems fair to assume that dislike of
pain would cut the trouble to small proportions. Of course the
law would refuse recovery to one guilty of a wilful act designed
to inflict injury upon himself.
The proposed system would treat the accident problem as a
social question and not as a strictly individual question. It would
more fairly distribute the burden of the daily danger of living,
because it would compensate all victims of mechanical accident,
and not simply those who could fasten responsibility on others
and show themselves free of negligence.
The province of this article is to call attention to the fact
that there is a serious problem caused by the immense increase in
accident litigation. The other large field of litigation, that which
involves breach of contracts, does not present a similar problem
because the right to compensation arises as a consequence of a
relation voluntarily entered upon and accrues usually to a man
able to await the issue of the case with some patience. The community properly feels only an obligation to act as umpire in the
controversy. But in a case of accident the loss is sudden and not
discounted in advance, it arises from a relation entered upon
most unwillingly, and it falls frequently upon persons unable to
sustain it and deprived by the accident itself of the means which
make patient waiting possible. -Besides these fundamental differences between accident and contract litigation, there are the
differences which make the amount of the damages exactly ascertainable in most contract cases and impossible of exact ascertainment in most accident cases.
Changes in the substantive or administrative law should
arise only out of a careful observation of recorded facts. Methods
of compensation other than that now employed are here suggested
to show that other methods are possible; but any change must
be gradual, so that practice will not run too far beyond experience. For example, the principle of a public fund might be applied at first only to accidents caused by common carriers, and
the fund could be created by contributions from the carriers and
from the state treasury, the carriers contributing more or less
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according to their several experience tables. Such a plan would
encourage care because negligence would increase the carrier's
premium the next year.
There can be little doubt that the present system is enormously expensive and cumbersome and that it is susceptible of very
greatly needed improvement. The field of accident litigation is
so extensive that the proper administration of justice within that
field should greatly concern lawyers, by whom the situation can
be best studied.
Such a study would cover (i) the magnitude of the problem as evidenced by the amount of energy and time spent on accident litigation; (2) a careful review of the disadvantages of the
present system; (3) a review of the various possible improvements or substitutes. If accident insurance were recommended as
desirable, the study would also include (4) the fixing of accident
insurance premiums, this by means of accident experience tables;
(5) the method of administering accident insurance; and (6) a
draft of an act to carry the scheme into effect. A careful consideration of the constitutional questions involved would also
be necessary.
Shippen Lewis.
Philadelphia,Pa.

